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This paper analyses the European Union (EU) - Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) interaction in a
perspective regarding identity as a set of constitutive norms, which are in close relation to "simple ".
regulative norms. On one hand, after the Cold War the EU found itself in a tortuous identity-
transformation process (well illustrated by the present Constitution debate). The 1989 CEE, on the other,
started in a power, ideology, and identity vacuum. Still, countries in the former communist camp able to
conclude European Agreements escaped Yugoslav and post-Soviet instability. They are now part of EU
(and NATO}.
Stability seems to be the key. But its explanation is not a simple, political/strategic one. I claim stability
was maintained due to a security regime within which Western values and norms were imported and
contributed to changing the CEE identities. In other words, EU's own constitutive norms were transmitted
to CEE through the intermediate of regulative norms this regime helped generalize.
The paper also examines the possibility that EU applies the same pattern to other targets: Western
Balkans, Commonwealth of Independent States, and Turkey. It is argued that the determinant factor is both
EU's and those countries' capacity to turn EU regulative norms into constitutive norms; that is, to create
EU identities.
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1.1ntroduction
During the last 15 years, one of the major pro-
blems confronting the European Union (EU) con-
cerned its symbiotic relation with Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). This paper analyzes the EU-CEE
interaction in a perspective that considers identity as
a set of constitutive norms, which are in close relation
with "simple", regulative norms. It is argued that
CEE's evolution from post-1989 identity vacuum to
THE EU membership is a direct consequence of the
transmission ofEU's own constitutive norms through
the intermediation of regulative norms generalized in
the framework of a CEE security regime.
First, the theoretical link between constitutive
and regulative norms is explored. Then, three key ele-
ments of any analysis concerning the CEE-EU rela-
tion are identified. This is followed by a presentation
*Notice about the author: Theodor Tudoroiu has a MA of the College of
Europe, Bruges, Belgium, and is currently writing a' Ph.D. thesis on
Central and Eastern European security in the Political Science
department of the Universite de Montreal. His previous publications are
related to European and Balkan security and European integration.
of the two components of the norms transfer process:
the Western genesis of norms and their Eastern
assimilation. Finally, Wendt's "three cultures of anar-
chy" are used to explain CEE's evolution and to eva-
luate the possibility of further EU enlargement.
2. Identity and Norms seen as
Constitutive and Regulative Norms
The theoretical approach I intend to adopt in this
paper is a Wendt-inspired branch of constructivism
emphasizing precisely "the power of identity" (Ha-
senclever et al. 1997: 167). In fact, as suggested by
the title of the chapter signed by Jepperson, Wendt
and Katzenstein (1996) - ''Norms, Identity, and Cul-
ture in National Security" - constructivism in general
closely associates identity and norms. This is done in
a context where "culture" is perceived as "a set of (oo.)
standards (...) defining what entities and actors exist
in a system and how they operate and interrelate" (p.
56). Following these same authors, "the concept of
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'identity' thus functions as a crucial link between
environmental structures and interests" (p. 59).
Towards the middle ofthe 90s, this essential role
was demonstrated by important empirical research.
The analysis of the end of South African apartheid,
performed by Audie Klotz (1995), the one dedicated
by Koslowski and Kratochwil to the end of the Soviet
empire (1994) and the empirical studies of the book
edited by Katzenstein (1996) (the most important
probably being Risse-Kappen's view of NATO as a
security community) demonstrated that "internati-
onal politics is not an autonomous sphere but always
part of a larger endeavor, that is, of institutionalizing
both identities and political communities as well as
their interactions" (Koslowski et Kratochwil 1994:
247).
Still, in most of these analyses the norms-
identity relation is unbalanced, attributing to the latter
a rather secondary role: it creates the link between
"environmental structures" and "interests" by modi-
fying itself under the influence of international
norms; but it can not directly influence these norms.
The CEE case is different, as the identity change was
paralleled by a transformation of the very nature of
intra-regional relations. This is the reason why I am
using Wendt's approach.
In this view, state-society complexes change
their identities due to a process of social learning
allowing them to accommodate international factors.
This change, in turn, modifies the international
milieu and the nature of relations between the respec-
tive states. Therefore, one can speak about a balanced
norms-identity relation.
For Wendt there are four forms of identity: per-
sonal (or, for organizations, corporative), type, role
and collective. Every actor (individual/state) can
have only one personal/corporative identity. It is a
kind of platform for the other forms, which are
multiple: "We all have many, many identities, and
this is no less true of states. Each is a script or schema,
constituted to varying degrees by cultural forms,
about who we are and what we should do in a certain
context" (Wendt 1999: 230). These identities are
constituted of structures that are interior ("identity is
at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an
actor's self-understanding", p. 224) and exterior
(following the logic of self-other relation).
It is interesting that, on one hand, the preemi-
nence of interior structures is acknowledged: «States
(individuals) are onto logically prior to the states
system (society)" (p. 244). But, on other hand, "The
fact that states' bodies are constituted by internal
structures in no way precludes them forming identi-
ties and interests by interacting with each other" (p.
245). In fact, this interaction constitutes the principal
engine of identity change, a process that Wendt
examines in detail in the first chapter of his book.
With regard to definitions, this author describes
the identity of a state-society complex as "relatively
stable, role-specific understandings and expectations
about self' (Wendt 1992: 397). In other words, iden-
tity is "a property of international actors that
generates motivational and behavioral dispositions"
(Wendt 1999: 224). One could notice that this per-
spective is quite close to that putting in relation iden-
tity and norms: "In much the same way that Wendt
has distinguished between structure and agent in
international relations theory, we will distinguish
between norms as the regulative cultural content of
international politics and identities - regulative ac-
counts of actors themselves" (Kowert et Legro 1996:
453). Approaching norms as "regulative norms" and
identities as "constitutive norms" provides a better
understanding of their relation: "One would expect
the regulative norms (..) to reflect the constitutive
norms that shape the collective identity of the security
community" (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368). As both
identities and norms are "normative structures" that,
through the intermediation of interests and policies,
determine the states' behavior (Kowert et Legro
1996: 462), it is by the study of this behavior that
identity change may be evaluated.
The next sections will introduce a security regi-
me. With regard to this subject, "Wendt (..) discusses
the identity problematic as one of whether and under
which conditions identities are more collective or
more egoistic. Depending on where states fall on this
continuum from positive to negative identification
with other states, they will be more or less willing to
engage in collective security practices" (Zehfuss
2002: 40). Therefore, this approach provides the
means to analyze both the identity change I consider
essential for CEE and the instruments that helped
produce this change.
3. The Three Key Elements of
CEE-EU Analysis
I have already mentioned the important role of
CEE in EU's debates. Reciprocally, for the Eastern
half of the European continent the relation with the
EU is essential. One can even say that, in CEE
context, "success" might well be related to a country's
admission to EU. From this point of view, there are
eight "successful" countries - the Visegrad 4, the
three Baltic States, and Slovenia - and two "almost
successful" - Bulgaria and Romania (already mem-
bers of NATO but relegated to a second wave of the
EU enlargement). On the other hand, the Western
Balkans and the CIS republics are clearly ''unsuc-
cessful".
In my view, any analysis of this differentiation
has to take into consideration three closely inter-
related elements: identity change, stability and the
existence of a special relation with EU.
Identity cbanee
The fall of communism created not only an
ideological, but also an identity vacuum in the former
Soviet block. The previous system of values was
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completely bankrupt; post-communist state-society
complexes needed to forge new identities.
Of course, all ex-communist countries progres-
sively acquired new identities, as none of them could
stay communist. But the direction of this change was
essential: it was only a Western- inspired, democratic
identity change which led to the above-mentioned
"success". The EU admission was the final stage ofa
trajectory marked by the assimilation of the Western
system of values. A quantitative proof of this state-
ment will be presented later in the paper.
Stability
In 1989, Yugoslavia seemed to be in the best
position to join EU: the burden of its communist past
was by far the lightest. Its relations with the West in
general and the European Community in particular
were excellent and had been so for a long time. But
political and military instability ruined any hope of
pro-Western evolution. From the siege ofVukovar to
the war in Kosovo, a decade was spent - and lost - in
warfare.
Stability, then, is another key element. But its
explanation cannot be a simple, political/strategic
one. Yugoslav wars were possible because post-com-
munist vacuum was filled by nationalist ideologies.
Nationalism was also present in many former Soviet
republics where it was often accompanied by diffe-
rent forms of authoritarian post-or even neo-com-
mumsm.
Proliferation of non-democratic systems of
values generated political and military instability. On
the contrary, there was no military tension in the area
progressively dominated by the Western system of
values. Democratic identity change was closely
associated to regional stability.
This affirmation might seem incomplete, as the
latter link has no obvious explanation. I claim that
democratic identity change and regional stability are
related due to an intermediate variable: an informal
CEE security regime, covering the ten "successful"
and "almost successful" countries and whose institu-
tional structure was based on the CSCE/OSCE, EUs
Europe Agreements and NATO's Partnership for
Peace (PfP).
It is through this regime that Western values and
norms were imported and contributed to changing
CEE identities. In other words, EUs own constitutive
norms were transmitted to CEE through the interme-
diation of regulative norms this regime helped gene-
ralize.
Special relation with EU
It is generally accepted that the EU - and particu-
larly, at least in the first phase, its Europe Agreements
- had a tremendous influence on CEE's overall
transformation. Table 1 illustrates the many instru-
ments employed in this process.
Still, two points have to be made. First, specific
actions and instruments are secondary in comparison
to the transfer of values and norms from the EU to
CEE. It is the success of this transfer - and the sub-
sequent identity change of CEE countries - that made
possible the creation and the efficiency of those
instruments. If the value transfer does not work -
which is the case in Turkey, for example - the overall
relation is unsatisfactory and the EU actions and
instruments remain modest and rather inefficient.
Second, the importance of the value transfer
makes illogical the separation of the EU from other
organizations accomplishing the same mission. I
consider the most important such organizations are
the other components of the CEE security regime:
CSCE/OSCE and NATO's PfP. They played a major
role in CEE's identity change process and their acti-
ons in this domain were convergent with those ofEU.
Therefore, instead of exclusively speaking of EUs
influence on CEE I will concentrate on the global
effect of the security regime on CEE state-society
complexes.
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These three elements - identity change, stability
and EUisecurity regime influence - are therefore not
only closely inter-related but also mutually consti-
tutive. There could be no identity change without
stability or without the regime's influence; stability
itself was a product of both security regime existence
and progressive identity transformation; and regime's
survival and functioning was possible only due to the
success of the identity change process. The next
sections will further explore the mechanisms of this
complex interdependence.
4. The Western Genesis of Norms
EU and, at a more general level, Western values
transformed CEE identities within a transfer process
following the next diffusion mechanism:
Western constitutive norms (international)
regulativenorms eEE constitutive norms
I will first address the earlier part ofthis process,
the creation of (international) regulative norms on the
basis of Western constitutive norms, id est on the
basis of Western identities. These identities, whose
fundamentals are democracy and capitalism, were
very well defmed at the level of state-society com-
plexes. However, in 1989 this was not the case for the
European Community itself.
One might say that even today things are not
much better and, short of a comprehensive European
Constitution, the European Union's identity remains
a matter of debate. But before Maastricht, despite the
modest progress due to the Single European Act, EC
legal texts were only superficially touching the ques-
tion of democracy. They could not yet provide the set
of regulative norms needed to transform the East.
This serious problem could nevertheless be
solved due to the fact that ECIEU did not act alone: it
or rather its CEE-oriented activities, and essentially
the Europe agreements, were a part of the CEE
security regime. In the framework of this regime, it
was the CSCE that had formally defined a set of
norms to be "exported" eastwards.
These norms originated in the famous Helsinki
Decalogue, itself inspired by UN values. In 1975,
Cold War made its implementation uncertain. Fifteen
years later, in a completely modified international
context, the same principles were much more attrac-
tive.
Nevertheless, with the exception of the seventh
principle, stating the respect of human rights, this was
a normative instrument exclusively focusing on
European stability. That is why the 1990 Charter of
Paris was used to add an important update: two new
provisions, concerning democracy and market econo-
my, allowing the creation of an effective set of (regula-
tive) norms perfectly reflecting Western constitutive
norms.
This new normative apparatus was diffused in
CEE by the CSCE itself, by the other components of
the security regime - both Europe Agreements and PiP
texts explicitly refer to the respect of Helsinki Final
Act principles and Charter of Paris provisions (Flynn
and Farrell 1999: 509) - and, at a general level, by all
Western organizations, states and NGOs interacting
withCEE.
Its complex structure, combining the "classical
democracy + capitalism" elements with the security-
related Helsinki principles, provided an ideological
and normative basis not only for the internal change
of CEE state-society complexes but also for the
transformation ofCEE intra-regional relations. Tran-
sition towards democracy and market economy was
to be protected by the stability insured by the security
regime; and this regime's success was to be facilitated
by the above-mentioned transition.
5. The Eastern Assimilation of
Western Norms
I shall now address the second part ofthe norms
transfer process: the transformation of'Western-origi-
nated regulative norms into CEE constitutive norms.
As already mentioned, the approach I adopt is based
on Wendt's sociological constructivism. Basically,
under the pressure of their international environment,
CEE state-society complexes were subject to a lear-
ning process. On one hand, this transformed their
identities; on another, the identity change helped furt-
her transform the international (regional) environ-
ment.
This complex phenomenon respects the
following scheme:
(Western inspired) international/European
environment creation of norms importation inter-
iorization identity change creation/developmentof
the regime
As we have already seen, the creation of norms
(that is the transformation of Western constitutive
norms into pan-European regulative norms) took
place within the CSCE. Their diffusion was insured
mainly by the newly created structures of the CEE
security regime. We might add that, mostly due to
their conditionality, the Europe Agreements were the
most efficient instrument of this normative transfer.
The next stage, interiorization and identity
change, took place at the level of state-society com-
plexes. It was greatly helped by the post-communist
identity vacuum and the consequent need of a new
system of values. But the Western norms were hardly
the only candidate. Two rival systems of values were
in the race: ultra-nationalism and (neo-) communism-
inspired authoritarianism.
In fact, out of the 27 post-communist states, only
the 10 members of the security regime succeeded in
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adopting Western norms. The identity change of the
remaining 17 countries (Western Balkans and CIS)
was not Western-inspired. This can be clearly demon-
strated using Freedom House's annual 'Freedom in the
World Country Ratings'.
For each country, these ratings express citizens'
degree of freedom computed on the basis of political
rights and civil liberties evaluation. In other words,
they are related to the system of values associated to
the political system of the respective country and
therefore illustrate the degree of Western-inspired
identity transformation of its state-society complex.
The ratings range from 1(absolute freedom) to 7
(no freedom). A country is free if it scores between 1
and 2.5, partially free between 3 and 5.5 and not free
between 5.5 and 7. The average regional ratings for
Western Balkans, CIS and the security regime for
1990-2002 are illustrated in graph No. 1:
non-democratic trends: not only the average was, for
most of the period, on the bad side of the 5.5 limit, but
in 2000 it started to worsen. If one might hope that,
one day, the Balkans reach the regime's present level
(Croatia is a good example), this doesn't seem to be
the case for most of the former Soviet republics.
This distribution and especially the enormous
difference among members of the regime and the rest
of former communist countries confirm the relation
between the Western norms assimilation and the
membership of the CEE security regime. It is within
this regime and only there that those norms and
values were assimilated by the population and the po-
litical system. Outside the regime, values of a diffe-
rent nature still predominate and political systems
were able to preserve their oppressive nature due to












Freedom House freedom ratings - average regional ratings for Western Balkans, CIS and the security regime, 1990-2002
The differences among the three regions are
obvious. The average for the regime's member
countries rapidly decreased to values typical of the
"free countries" category, continuously improved
and came very close to the Western Europe level (1.2
in comparison to 1.1). On the contrary, the other two
regions preserved average ratings close to the limit
separating "partly free" and "free" countries. Western
Balkans, marked by the nationalism associated with
the Yugoslav secession war, started very late a pro-
gress that brought them in 2002 at the level the regime
had had eleven years earlier. Things are even worse in
. CIS, where neo-communism, nationalism and feudal
(if not even tribal) traditions combined to reinforce
Next, I return to the scheme of CEE identity
transformation. Its last part is about the effects ofthis
change on the international/regional environment.
More precisely, while Western Balkans and CIS
associated non-Western systems of values with mili-
tary instability, countries having interiorized Western
norms added to their internal identity change an
external one directly linked to the stability compo-
nent illustrated by the Helsinki Decalogue.
Since 1989, there was absolutely no military
tension between countries characterized by the adop-
tion of Western norms. This helped create a stable,
pacific regional environment favoring the further de-
velopment of the security regime. In turn, the regime
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helped reinforce the pacific trend, thus protecting the
transformation process within the respective states.
6. A Voyage through the Three
Cultures of Anarchy
One of Wendt's important contributions to the
study of international system's evolution is his theory
concerning "the three cultures of anarchy". Fol-
lowing this approach, there can be an evolution (not
mandatory but at least unidirectional, except for exo-
genous shock) between the three possible "cultures of
anarchy": from Hobbes (enemies) to Locke (rivals)
and then towards Kant (friends). The existence of a
Kantian culture does not mean absolute harmony: all
three cultures share three degrees of internalization of
the norms (by force, price and legitimacy), which
simultaneously influence international relations.
Since 1989, CEE has followed exactly this tra-
jectory. Acting under the pressure off actors related to
constraint, interest and legitimacy, CEE states found
themselves in a continuous identity transformation,
which made them evolve from the Hobbesian anar-
chy (the security vacuum of 1989-90) to a Lockean
culture (the CEE security regime) preparing the recent
passage to the Kantian culture ofthe enlarged EU.
This evolution was largely influenced by the EU
and especially by its Europe Agreements. But it could
have not been so rapid without the contribution of
other structures and above all without the norm
genesis and diffusion process that took place within
CSCE.
A logical question envisions the possibility of
extending this evolution to other areas. Of course,
Bulgaria, Romania and, very probably, Croatia, are
already on their way. In fact, Bulgaria's main problem
is the link Brussels sees between Sofia's and Bucha-
rest's adhesion. In contrast, Romania's laggardness in
completing the negotiation process is a matter of
serious concern. If the conclusion of negotiations in
2004 is missed, Bucharest might have to wait for some
more years. And, given the extreme efficiency of
Zagreb's efforts towards accession, one could even
take into consideration a Romania-Croatia simulta-
neous enlargement sometime in 2009-2011. Still, the
point is that, even in Romania, the identity change is
following its course in the good direction. Speed might
be unsatisfactory, but this is a secondary matter.
Turkey, on the other hand, does not seem to fol-
low. Instead of assimilating Western norms, its
society is more and more attracted by Islamic values.
Of course, one might claim that Turkish Islamists are
not fundamentalist and should be seen as a Muslim
equivalent of Christian-Democrats. Indeed, no anti-
democratic political action can be pointed out. But
this is at least in part due to Turkish military pressure
and to the EU conditionality. Furthermore, the ques-
tion is not if that society's transformation is from
secular towards fundamentalist Islamic values or
towards moderate Islamic ones. The question is if
Turkey's identity change is due to the assimilation of
the Western democratic system of values. As this is
not the case, there is an evolution that clearly dis-
tances Turkish society from the CEE pattern and,
consequently, makes improbable its admission into
theEU.
The Western Balkans (Croatia excepted) are in
no better situation. In Serbia, ultra-nationalist and
anti-Western views are still predominant. It might
take a generation to change that. Bosnia and Kosovo
are international protectorates, which have to become
real states before even thinking about the EU adhe-
sion. Albania and Macedonia, while in a better posi-
tion, also need huge improvements of their internal
situation. Overall, most of the region is highly unpre-
pared to follow the CEE pattern of identity change.
Still, it has a tremendous advantage: the proximity of
the EU and its involvement are slowly pushing things
in the good direction. It might be long, but the final
result can be positive.
The Commonwealth of Independent States
seems, on the contrary, unable to follow a similar tra-
jectory. Its limited democratic or clearly authoritarian
regimes cannot provide the framework required by a
Western-inspired identity change. Therefore, official
statements claiming the political will - or interest - to
create conditions for a (remote) EU enlargement in
that region cannot be taken into consideration. One
might say that CIS external border seems to be the
"natural limit" ofthe EU expansion.
7. Conclusions
The fundamental element of the EU-CEE rela-
tion (and of the latter's absorption by the former) is
identity change. Nevertheless, this change has to be
considered in close association with regional stability
and with the contribution of other organizations be-
sides EU. Western constitutive norms generated simi-
lar CEE constitutive norms through the inter-
mediation of international regulative norms created
and transmitted in the framework of a CEE security
regime whose components were CSCE/OSCE, ED's
European Agreement and NATO's PfP.
Only ex-communist state-society complexes
having successfully completed this identity trans-
formation were able to migrate from the Hobbesian
anarchy (the security vacuum of 1989-90) to a
Lockean culture (the CEE security regime) and then
to the Kantian culture ofEU. Bulgaria, Romania and
Croatia will soon follow the same trajectory. But the
remaining Western Balkans might need a generation
to imitate them while Turkey and the Commonwealth
of Independent States, sharing different systems of
values, are unlikely candidates for the future EU
enlargement. •
JANUARY - JUNE 2004 63
BIBLIOGRAPHY
CSCE (1975) Acte Final, Conference sur la Securite et la
Cooperation en Europe, Helsinki, ler aoiit 1975.
CSCE (1990) Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe, Conference
sur la Securite et la Cooperation en Europe, Paris, 19-21 novembre 1990.
Demetropoulou, Leeda (2002), 'Europe and the Balkans:
Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity
in South Eastern Europe', Southeast European Politics, 3(2-3),
November2002,pp.87-106.
Flynn, Gregory et Henry Farrell (1999) 'Piecing Together the
Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" of
Security in Post-Cold War Europe', International Organization 53(3),
SununerI999,pp.505-535.
Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org consulted December 10,
2003.
Hasenclever, Andreas, Peter Mayer et Volker Rittberger (1997)
Theories 0/ International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Jepperson, Ronald 1., Alexander Wendt et Peter J. Katzenstein
(1996), 'Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security' in Peter J.
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity
in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 33-78.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.) (1996) The Culture of National Security.
Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Klotz, Audie (1995), Norms in International Relations: The Struggle
against Apartheid, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
For these authors, "identities ( ..) are prescriptive representations of
political actors themselves and of relationships to each other" (Kowert et
Legro 1996: 453).
Risse-Kappen defines norms as "collective expectations of proper
behavior for a given identity" (Risse-Kappen 1996: 368).
For a complete presentation of this regime see Tudoroiu (2003).
I. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty.
II. Refraining from the threat or use offorce.
III. Inviolability of frontiers.
IV.Territorial integrity of States.
V.Peaceful settlement of disputes.
VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs.
VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
Koslowski, Rey et Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1994), Understanding
change in international politics: the Soviet empire's demise and the
international system', International Organization, 48(2), Spring 1994,
pp.215-247.
Kowert, Paul et Jeffrey Legro (1996) 'Norms, Identity, and Their
Limits: A Theoretical Reprise' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture 0/
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York:
Columbia University Press, pp. 451-497.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996) 'Collective Identity in a Democratic
Community: The Case ofNATO' in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture
0/ National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York:
Columbia University Press, 357-399.
Tismaneanu, Vladimir and Mircea Mihaies, Incet, spre Europa. Iasi:
Polirom, 2000.
Tudoroiu, Theodor (2003), 'Le regime de securite de I'Europe
Centrale et Orientale post-communiste', paper presented at the Colloquc
des etudiants des cycles superieurs du Groupe d'etude et de recherche sur
la securite internationale (GERSI) "Relations internationales et etudes de
securite", Mars 29, 2003, Montreal, Quebec.
Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy Is What States Make ofIt: The
Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organization 46,
pp.391-425.
Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory 0/ International Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zehfuss, Maja (2002) Constructivism in International Relations. The
Politics ofReality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
NOTES
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.
VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
IX. Cooperation among States.
X. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law.
(CSCE 1975: la)
All data was found at www.freedomhouse.org.
EU's influence took all these forms, especially if one regards its
conditionality policy towards CEE. ptp was closer to the first two
factors while CSCEIOSCE exclusively used the legitimacy component.
The title of a book on this subject can be quoted as a good
intuitive description of the situation: "Slowly, towards Europe"
(Tismaneanu and Mihaies 2000).
